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ABSTRACT
There are many differences in behavior across couples of different sexual
orientations — some well known, others not. We propose a model which
explains differences in expected matching behavior, marriage rates, non-
child-friendly activities, and fertility, based on different costs of procreation
and complementarities between marriage and children. The model predicts
that the biological traits of same-sex couples, unlike those of heterosex-
ual couples, should not be correlated — holding constant other household
production characteristics. In addition, the model predicts that hetero-
sexuals have a higher probability of having children and getting married,
and that childless heterosexuals are less likely to engage in behaviors not
complementary with children than childless gays and lesbians. Using two
nationally representative probability samples that self-identify sexual ori-
entation, these predictions are confirmed.
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1. Introduction
Recent work on labor market choices has shown that same-sex couples often make
different human capital decisions that reflect their lifestyle, gender composition, and pro-
creative constraints.1 This nascent economic work, however, seldom directly relates to
family or marriage behavior.2 Given the obvious difference in the ability to directly pro-
create between opposite and same-sex couples, and given the complementarities between
marriage and children, it seems intuitive that there should be differences in matching, rea-
sons to marry, frequency of marriage, behavior not complementary with children, and the
presence of children.
We model different procreation and childbearing costs across sexual orientations, pre-
dict differences in the aforementioned behaviors, and confirm the predictions with high
quality data. While some examined differences in behavior are anecdotally well-known or
have been found in other small sample work, we make three major contributions. First,
we show that a wide range of differences in behavior can hinge on differences in the cost
of procreation and child raising. Other theories based on thin markets, preferences, or
stigma can each explain some, but not all, of the behaviors that we examine. Second, we
document that matching behavior differs across sexual orientations. To our knowledge, no
other model predicts the specific matching behavior that we identify.3 Finally, we test our
model with two large Canadian probability samples.
Because same-sex couples are unable to procreate, they must engage in some type of
more expensive procedure to acquire children when they want them. The current channels
by which a same-sex couple must either conceive, adopt, or otherwise acquire children,
are all considerably more costly than heterosexual sex. There is a large literature spread
across several fields (law, tax, gender studies) supporting this cost difference. For example,
cost differences arise over the need to find and contract with third parties, the expense
of artificial reproductive technologies, discrimination over access to technologies, legal and
social barriers to adoption, and differences in tax deductibility considerations for same-sex
couples.4 Once all of the legal and social hurdles have been met, the specific costs are still
1 On differences, see Harris (2011), Negrusa and Oreffice (2011), Oreffice (2016), Black et al. (2002), or
Black et al. (p. 54, 2007). On similarities, see Oreffice (2010), Jepsen and Jepsen (2002), or Allen (2015).
2 The exceptions are Carpenter and Gates (2008), and Alde`n et al. (2015).
3 Ciscato et al. (2015) examine same-sex matching on other dimensions.
4 See, for example, Alde`n et al. (2015), Black et al. (2007), Daar (2008), Goldberg (2012), Ikemoto
(1996), Morgan (2004), or Pratt (2009).
considerable. At the low end, artificial insemination for lesbians costs around $1000 per
trial, with a 5-25% success rate — more if fertility drugs are used.5 At the higher end,
surrogacy for gay couples can cost in the tens of thousands of dollars.6 Throughout the
paper, we recognize and exploit the fact that these costs are greater for gays compared to
lesbians.
There are also differences in the costs of raising children, due to some or all of the
following: discrimination and stigma, bonding and affinity issues resulting from lack of bi-
ological connection, social disapproval, behavior problems arising over knowledge of having
been donor inseminated, or the imperfect substitutability of “mothering” and “fathering.”
This cost claim is strongly supported by the literature, and the asymmetric list of issues
faced by lesbian and gay couples is long.7
A higher cost of children means that: (i) fewer should be demanded by same-sex
couples, even if they have the same desire for children as opposite-sex couples, and (ii)
these couples have less incentive to avoid behaviors, lifestyles, and social capital invest-
ments that are not complementary with children, and thus should engage in them more
frequently. Moreover, due to differences in the ways in which children are acquired, all else
equal, heterosexuals should place greater value on the quality of their partner’s inherita-
ble traits than gays and lesbians, which should lead to (for heterosexuals relative to gays
and lesbians): (iii) a stronger positive relation between these traits and the probability
of marriage, and (iv) more pronounced assortative matching along these traits. In short,
the marital behavior of same-sex couples is likely to be different from opposite-sex couples
because the shadow prices they face are different, and these same differences should exist
between gay and lesbian couples for the same reason.
Given that the “costs of children” are not directly observable in our data, one might
object that our results are driven by differences in preferences for children, marriage, and
other elements of relationships rather than by such costs. Our goal is to show that our
5 See “Costs of fertility treatments in Canada” accessed online, January 18 2016 at http://www.babycenter.ca/
a1028300/cost-of-fertility-treatments-in-canada.
6 For example, Pratt (2009) argues that even the tax law for the deductibility of infertility treatments is
biased against same-sex couples. Pratt analyzes a watershed case where a gay male’s use of surrogates cost
$95,903 over the course of two years. Gay couples face considerable legal challenges in forming families with
surrogates that are not faced by lesbian couples dealing with sperm donation.
7 See, for example, Dempsey (2012, 2013), Bergman (2010), or Jones (2005). Many children in same-sex
households come from previous heterosexual unions (Gates 2011), which means prior spouses are involved
in raising children.
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model is consistent with a wide range of phenomena, even if one assumes that everyone has
the same preferences.8 Preferences may not be the same across orientations, but we simply
argue that even if they were the same and even though both same-sex and opposite-sex
couples are present in the marriage market, there should be differences in their family
behaviors given the different costs of having and raising children.
We use two large data sets to analyze different types of households in terms of their
potential marriage behavior. The first is the Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS),
which is a large, nationally representative, probability sample of Canadian households that
self-identifies sexual orientation. These data have excellent measures of health, and allow
for the direct identification of gay and lesbian individuals (single and married).9 Despite its
advantages, the CCHS is unable to test our matching hypothesis because the information
it contains on the respondent’s spouse is too limited. Hence, we also use the 2006 Canada
Census, which contains a large 20% random sample of the population that self-identifies
same-sex couples. The overall evidence of differences in behavior between gays, lesbians,
and heterosexuals is strongly consistent with our model.10
We present our model in Section 2, and discuss our data and empirical results in Section
3.
2. A Model of Marriage, Children, and Matching
We present a matching model where the key feature is a difference in the cost of children
across three different sexual orientations: heterosexual, gay, and lesbian.11 We assume that
members of each group only match with members from the same group, all pregnancies
8 There are two other reasons for generating results without resorting to different preferences. First,
differences in costs are observable, in principle. Explanations based on differences in unobservable preferences
are ad hoc (Stigler and Becker, 1977). Second, there are widespread claims made in the academic literature,
the popular press, and by professional bodies that preferences are similar (e.g., American Psychological
Association, Resolution on Marriage Equality, 2011; Badgett, p. 1105, 2010); or Patterson (p. 115, 1995).
9 It also allows for the identification of bi-sexuals, but we drop bi-sexuals from the analysis. However,
none of the general results of the paper change when bi-sexuals are included.
10 The heterogeneity in behaviors between lesbians and gays suggests that differences in sexual orientation
are more nuanced than the simple heterosexual versus homosexual split. Alde`n et al. (2015) also find
difference between gay and lesbian couples in the reasons for marriage. They find that for gays, the main
benefit is “resource pooling”; for lesbians, it is a “vehicle for family formation” (pp. 1265–1266).
11 We abstract from the fact that some people may be able to choose between the same-sex and the
heterosexual markets. Many of these individuals would self-identify as bi-sexual, which are excluded from our
empirical analysis and a small part of the sample. Furthermore, these individuals face the same constraints
on procreation as others in whichever market they choose.
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are planned, and only couples have children. Individuals are initially randomly paired in
a “date” and incur a search cost k > 0. Later they decide if they want to be a couple, and
once a couple, they decide if they want to marry and/or to have children. Individuals can
reject a date and go back to the dating pool, but once a person is coupled, they remain so.
In addition, we assume that spouses have the same preferences over children and marriage
and that there are no transfers, which allows for an abstraction of bargaining issues within
a household and allows a focus on cost differences in conception and child rearing between
the different couple types.
Every type of individual is described by two traits (gi, hi) distributed according to a
positive density on [0, G] × [0, H]. 12 The trait gi is a quality index related to biological
reproduction: it accounts for expected longevity, health, fertility and other features that
could be passed on to children, and also accounts for an individual’s reproductive fitness.
The trait hi is an index of characteristics such as education, talent, etc. that produce
non-child household production. A component of every potential match payoff is hij =
m(hi, hj), where m is increasing in hi and hj , that measures the utility of household
production independent of children or marriage. We do not assume that g is independent
of h. Therefore, our model could easily accommodate characteristics that contribute to
both traits: for example, intelligence may be passed on, and may also produce non-child
related household production.
Stage Play
There are three stages of play to the matching game.
Stage 1: Singles are randomly paired in a dating market at cost k > 0.
Stage 2: Each person i decides if he wants to break up after observing the other
person’s gj and their hij . Coupling is mutual, so either can break the date and
return to stage 1.
Stage 3: Each couple cij that remains together now observes c ∈ <, their suit-
ability for marriage, and decides whether to marry, and whether to have children.13
12 The closest one-dimensional counterpart to the matching portion of our model is Morgan (1998). Atakan
(2006) studies a similar model, but with transferable utility. Both papers obtain assortative matching if
surplus is super-modular in matched types. Lindenlaub (2014) studies multi-dimensional matching, but in
a frictionless setting.
13 To simplify notation, we drop the subscripts for couple cij . Couples are assumed to have the optimal
number of children if they have any.
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We assume that c is independent of all other variables and distributed according
to a continuous cumulative distribution function. We do not, however, constrain its
sign: some couples may prefer the status and institutional protections of marriage,
while others may prefer the flexibility of remaining unmarried.
Person i has the following separable utility function over children and household pro-
duction when matched with person j:
Uij = vij + hij ,
=
{
[γ(gi, gj) +Mc − s− fc + cMc] + hij if children
cMc + hij if no children
(1)
Note that vij captures the utility related to marriage and children, and hij captures all
other household utility. The sub-utility function vij has a number of components. First,
γ(gi, gj) is the expected utility of children, conditional on the biological attributes of the
couple. We assume that γ(gi, gj) = max{a, b(gi, gj)}, where a is the expected utility from
adopting, and b is the expected utility from having own biological children.14 For same-
sex couples, option b is unavailable — this is not a critical assumption.15 We assume b is
increasing in both arguments; that is, gi and gj both improve child quality.
Second, Mc is an indicator variable for being married. Marriage is understood to be an
institution complementary to children, and we normalize the value of this increase to 1.16
The variable s is the value of activities foregone due to the presence of children. This is
the value of behaviors that are not complementary with children and which are sacrificed
when children arrive. Finally, our critical variable is fc, the cost of having children. These
costs are assumed to be zero for opposite-sex couples, for whom children are a by-product
of sex. Importantly, these costs are positive for same-sex couples, and vary across gay and
lesbian couples. Lesbian couples might have to engage in costly insemination procedures,
14 Even assuming that all heterosexuals rear their own biological children, there can be a supply of children
for adoption from various sources, such as parent deaths and foreign countries.
15 Explicitly modelling surrogacy/insemination would strengthen predicted differences between gays/lesbians
and heterosexuals — gays and lesbians with higher g would care less than gays and lesbians with lower g
about their partner’s g because only the higher g would be used — but adds complexity. Hence, we ignore
these options.
16 This is an important assumption in our model. It has been suggested that some benefits of marriage,
such as companionship, may be more valuable to childless couples, so that marriage and children may be
substitutes in certain ways. However, it appears reasonable to assume that, overall, marriage and children
are complements (Alde`n et al., 2015). Therefore, one may interpret this “1” as the net amount by which
marriage increases the value of children.
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but these are less expensive than surrogacy. Therefore, we assume that the costs of children
are related to sexual orientation; that is, fGay > fLesbian > fHetero = 0.
17
Table 1 shows the four possible utility outcomes once a pairing decides to be a couple
(subscripts have been suppressed).
Table 1
Individual Marriage and Child Payoffs
No Children Children
Cohabiting (A): h (C): h+ γ − s− fc
Married (B): h+ c (D): h+ c + γ + 1− s− fc
No outcome dominates the others, and which outcome is chosen depends on the cou-
ple’s specific values of the various utility components. The difference in utility between
cohabitation with children (option (C)) and marriage with children (option (D)) is 1 + c.
The utility difference between cohabitation and marriage without children is just c. These
values may be greater or less than zero depending on the couples suitability for marriage.
The difference in utility between married couples with children and married couples with-
out children is γ + 1 − s − fc, which can also be greater or less than zero. As a result,
different couple combinations will choose different outcomes with respect to marriage and
children.
In order to save space, below we present our propositions as intuitively as possible.
The full model, formal results and proofs are available in an online appendix.18
Incentive to To Marry and Have Children
The model generates one proposition and four corollaries with respect to marriage and
children that are quite intuitive.
17 More broadly, fc can also be understood as including the cost of raising children, which, as discussed
in the introduction, may also be higher for same-sex couples than for opposite-sex ones. Moreover, one
could assume fc to be stochastic, and that the distributions by sexual orientation are ranked by first-order
stochastic dominance. Doing so does not qualitatively impact any of our propositions and corollaries.
18 See www.sfu.ca/˜ allen/REHOAppendix.html.
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Proposition 1. Same-sex couples are no more likely to marry than heterosexual couples,
and they are strictly less likely to do so than a heterosexual couple with biological traits
(gi, gj) when s > a− fLesbian and s < max{a, b(gi, gj)}+ 1.19
Corollary 1. Lesbian couples are at least as likely to marry as gay couples, and more so
if a− fGay < s < a+ 1− fLesbian.
Corollary 2. Heterosexual couples are at least as likely to have children as lesbian couples,
which are in turn at least as likely to do so as gay couples. These relations are strict as
long as a− fLesbian < s < a+ 1− fLesbian, so that some, but not all lesbian couples adopt.
Proposition 1 and the first two corollaries can be understood from Table 1. Consider
an increase in fc to f
′
c, all else equal. Couples who would have chosen no children before
the change do not change their behavior because fc is not in their payoff function. Couples
who would have chosen children with cohabitation reveal that γ − s − fc > 0, and an
increase in fc means that those at the margin will now decide to have no children. Finally,
couples who would have chosen marriage with children under the original cost will now
continue with (D) or choose (A) or (B), depending on how close they are to indifference
between having children or not.20
In other words, an increase in the cost of children leads some couples to forego having
children, and some of these couples will also forego marriage as a result. No couple changes
its decision in the opposite direction. Since fGay > fLesbian > 0, all other attributes equal,
gay couples should be the least likely to have children and marry because fc is greatest for
them, followed by lesbian couples, and finally heterosexual couples. Two other intuitive
results follow from the model:
Corollary 3. Gay couples are at least as likely to engage in behaviors not complementary
with children as lesbian couples, which in turn are at least as likely as heterosexual couples
to engage in non-complementary behaviors.21
Corollary 4. Suppose couples A and B have biological traits (gi, gj) and (g
′
i, g
′
j), respec-
tively, with gi > g
′
i, gj ≥ g′j , and b(gi, gj) > a. Then if the couples are heterosexual, couple
19 These conditions are most likely to hold when a is low relative to b(gi, gj), which implies a high cost of
adoption.
20 Note that they do not choose to cohabit with children (option C) because they have revealed 1 + c > 0,
and this does not depend on fc.
21 The empirical work examines three such behaviors: smoking, illegal drug use, and sexual activity with
multiple partners.
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A is more likely to marry than couple B, while if they are same-sex, they have the same
probability of marriage.
Corollary 3 follows from Corollary 2, while Corollary 4 follows because, if the couples
are heterosexual, couple A has a higher γ than couple B, which is equivalent to a lower f .
Matching Behavior
To close the matching model, we assume that individuals leaving the dating pool are
replaced by individuals with the same characteristics.22
Same-Sex Matching
Given that same-sex couples cannot procreate together, their biological traits cannot
be complementary, and are not considered in matching.
Proposition 2. In any equilibrium for same-sex couples, for any h ∈ [0, H], the set of
partners that would accept type (g, h) as a mate, as well as as the set of partners that are
acceptable to type (g, h) as mates, are independent of g.
Therefore, conditional on hi, the expected g of individual i’s partner in a same-sex
couple is independent of gi. In other words, the biological fitness of same-sex partners
should be uncorrelated, conditional on h. This will not be true in general for heterosexual
couples because their biological fitness is passed on to their own offspring.
Heterosexual Matching
For heterosexual matching, we assume that b(., .) is super-modular; that is, if gi > g
′
i
and gj > g
′
j , then b(gi, gj) + b(g
′
i, g
′
j) > b(gi, g
′
j) + b(g
′
i, gj).
23 For example, individuals
with high g may place greater value on their children having high g because they do not
want their children to face difficulties that they did not face. Alternatively, if parents are
22 As discussed by Chiappori, McCann and Neishem (2010), there is no straightforward way to generalize
the concept of assortative matching to multiple dimensions. We simply show that, in our setting, equilibria
exhibit characteristics suggesting that heterosexuals with higher g (holding h fixed) tend to have partners
with higher g. This is the hypothesis that we will take to the data.
23 In the online appendix, we show that if the expected utility from biological children b(., .) is super-
modular, then the expected utility of marriage and children v(., .) is weakly super-modular. The argu-
ment is simple: if b(., .) is super-modular, then the expected utility from children γ(., .) must be weakly
super-modular. Adding marriage into the mix does not change this fact because marriage and children are
complementary.
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risk-averse with respect to the quality of traits passed on to the child, then it is more
important for an individual with high g to have a partner with high g (so that good traits
are passed on for sure) than for an individual with a low g.
Under the above assumption, heterosexuals with higher g are more selective than
individuals with lower g when considering partners with low g. This points to assorting
along the g dimension for heterosexual matching, and leads to the result below. To avoid
confusion between specific own type and a generic partner’s type, we denote the partner’s
type as (x, y), where x is the biological trait, and y is the household trait. Moreover, we
assume that for every gi, v(gi, G) − v(gi, 0) > 0. That is, every heterosexual cares about
the biological trait of their partner at least to some extent.
Proposition 3. There is weakly positive assortative matching in g for heterosexual cou-
ples, in the sense that, in equilibrium, for any h and whenever g > g′, when considering
partners with sufficiently low x, type (g, h) is no less selective than (that is, require y as
least as high as) type (g′, h) is, and is strictly more selective if the probability of having
biological children is positive.
To understand the intuition for this result, consider an indifference curve for types
(g, h) and (g′, h), where g > g′, plotted on a plane with the partner’s biological trait on
the horizontal axis and the partner’s household trait on the vertical axis in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 Here]
Consider the indifference curve for either “high” type (g, h) or “low” type (g′, h). For
low values of x, the benefits from adopting children are greater than from procreation, and
the indifference curves remain flat: the biological trait x has no value in this region. Once
b > a, the indifference curves start to fall because one type is willing to substitute x and y
in a partner. This occurs sooner for high type (g, h) than for low type (g′, h) since g > g′.
Moreover, whenever the marginal utility of x for high type (g, h) is nonzero, it is greater
than the marginal utility of x for low type (g′, h). Hence, whenever it is not flat, high type
(g, h)’s indifference curve at a given (x, y) is strictly steeper than low type (g′, h)’s at the
same (x, y).24
Consider a potential mate given by point 1 in the graph. High type (g, h) would reject
this person as a match because they fall below their indifference curve boundary. On the
other hand, low type (g′, h) would accept this person as a mate. Now consider another
24 The downward sloping part of the indifference curves need not be concave as depicted.
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potential mate given by point 2. This person has a higher x and lower y than the person
at point 1. Now high type (g, h) finds this person acceptable, while low type (g′, h) does
not. The reason is the supermodularity of expected utility in the biological traits: high
biological traits matter more to high type (g, h) than to low type (g′, h). Figure 1 is one
example of the how the boundary conditions might look for types (g, h) and (g′, h). There
are actually three cases, and each is considered in the online appendix. All cases generate
the result.
Our model thus predicts differences in behavior without positing any difference in
preferences, marriage market conditions (thinness), costs of marriage, or type distribu-
tions across sexual orientations. Instead, they all occur due to simple variations across
orientations in the availability of means of conception and/or the cost of having children.
More complicated models are possible, but our goal is to examine if differences in the costs
of children can explain a wide range of differences in behavior between couples of different
orientations.25
3. Empirical Results
3.1. The Data
Data for most of our tests come from years 2005, 2007-2010, 2013, and 2014 of the
restricted CCHS master files — a probability sample survey with a cross-section design.26
The target population of the CCHS is all Canadians aged 12 and over, it covers 98% of the
provincial populations, and data is collected through computer assisted interviews. Given
the cross-section structure, our data is suitable for finding the correlations predicted by
our model, but not for establishing causal linkages.
The CCHS has extensive information on the respondent, but only limited information
on all other members of the household. What makes it particularly unique for a large
probability sample is that it self-identifies sexual orientation — heterosexual, gay, lesbian,
25 These predictions would hold for other types of couples who, ex ante, would be predicted to have high
costs of procreation. For example, these predictions would apply to couples that are elderly or infertile at
the time of matching. Unfortunately, the data set used here does not allow the identification of such couples.
26 There was no survey in 2006, and the critical self-reported health variable was dropped from the survey
in 2011 and 2012. The full CCHS is not a public use data set. Results are screened by Statistics Canada,
and as a result, no maximums, minimums, or sample counts for variables are reported in this paper, and the
data are not available from the authors. The data and procedures are available from Statistics Canada for
researchers approved for access by Statistics Canada.
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and bi-sexuality — for all individuals, including singles. Some might critique direct self-
reporting of sexual orientation on the grounds that some individuals are unwilling to reveal
such sensitive information; however, self-reporting is better than the alternatives, and the
CCHS has some additional advantages. First, it does not indirectly identify same-sex
couples through responses to a series of questions. Such methods fail to identify gays
or lesbians who are single, fail to distinguish bi-sexual individuals, are subject to the
same under-reporting problem, and have the added problem of capturing large numbers
of heterosexual couples who incorrectly record the wrong sex.27 Second, the CCHS’s
refined identification of bi-sexual individuals is helpful for reducing measurement error in
identifying gays and lesbians.
Finally, the CCHS data are from Canada, where one could argue there has been little
official discrimination against same-sex couples for some time: same-sex couples have had
all taxation and government benefits since 1997, and same-sex marriage has been legal since
2001–2005.28 Other social scientists have noted that legalization has reduced the stress and
stigma of homosexuality in Canada, which makes it more likely that respondents would
answer questions honestly.29 All things considered, the CCHS is an excellent large, random
sample data set available to study non-heterosexuals.30
3.2. Basic Demographics
27 The Williams Institute 2010 census study claims that the total national error rate is approximately
0.25%. The problem is that small errors in the large heterosexual response rate leads to large errors in the
small same-sex sample.
28 Regarding his 1967 Omnibus bill that legalized homosexuality, Justice Minister Pierre Trudeau famously
stated that “There’s no place for the state in the bedrooms of the nation ... what’s done in private be-
tween adults doesn’t concern the Criminal Code.” (http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories /politics/rights-
freedoms/trudeau). Many Canadians consider this the watershed moment for the acceptance of homosex-
uality in Canada. In Canada, same-sex couples were allowed to adopt before they were allowed to marry.
Ontario became the first province to allow adoption in 1997. Others quickly followed. The first Canadian
same-sex marriages took place on January 14, 2001 at the Toronto Metropolitan Community Church. These
became the basis of a successful legal challenge that ended at the court of appeal on June 10, 2003. On July
20, 2005, the federal government passed the Civil Marriage Act that made Canada the fourth country in the
world to legalize same-sex marriage. Thus, different people date the arrival of same-sex marriage in Canada
as 2001, 2003, or 2005.
29 See, for example, Biblarz and Savci (p. 490, 2010).
30 It is possible that those who self-identify as gay or lesbian may also be more likely to self-identify
the use of drugs, multiple sex partners, and the like. This, however, would not explain other systematic
differences in behaviors that carry less stigma. For example, though not reported, there are differences in
alcoholic consumption rates across the sexual orientations that one would not expect if the results were
purely selection driven.
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Table 2 shows some estimated population characteristics for the three household types
in Canada.31 The numbers are consistent with other findings based on same-sex couples
from nonrandom samples. The facts are also consistent with our model predictions.
Table 2 shows that gays and lesbians make up tiny fraction of the population, and, as
in several other data sets, there are more gays than lesbians.32 Overall, 43.2% of lesbians
are single, and only 14.5% of them are married. Gay men are much more likely to be single
(59.7%), and less likely to be married (only 9.8%); the opposite is true for heterosexuals
(29.2% and 48.4% respectively). The percentage of households with children under 18 is
10.3% for lesbians, only 2.7% for gays, and 24.7% for heterosexuals.
In terms of income, the CCHS confirms findings from other studies: gay and lesbian
households do not appear to suffer any household income penalty.33 Heterosexuals, despite
their average incomes, are more likely to own their home compared to all other groups,
and heterosexuals are more likely to report no health problems. Lesbians are more likely
to be white, and on average both gays and lesbians are considerably more educated than
heterosexuals. Heterosexuals are less likely to be smokers, on average. However, perhaps
the most striking difference is with respect to sexual behavior. In this regard, lesbians and
heterosexuals appear quite similar on average: 85.29% and 83.22% had only one sexual
partner in the past twelve months, and around 3% of them had more than four. In contrast,
gays are much less likely to have one sexual partner in the past twelve months, and much
more likely to have had more than four (20.6%). All of these unconditional averages are
qualitatively consistent with our model.
3.3. Children, Behavior, and Marriage
Our model makes a series of predictions regarding family behaviors for heterosexuals,
gays, and lesbians. In Table 3, we present the results of five logit regressions, estimated
together as seemingly unrelated regressions, to test these predictions.34
31 All of the results of this paper are weighted estimates from the CCHS sample. As a result, we will
normally drop the adjective “estimated” unless the context calls for clarification.
32 These estimates are not that different from fractions found in other random samples. For example,
Wainright et al. (2004), using the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescence Health, find that lesbians
make up about 1/3 of one percent of the sample. Golombok et al. (2003), using the Avon Longitudinal
Study of Parents and Children, find that .22% of the mothers are lesbians.
33 See Ahmed, Andersson, & Hammarstedt (2011) or Carpenter (2004).
34 Many other combinations of controls, weighting, and robust errors were tried, but unreported to keep
the table sizes manageable. The results from these unreported regressions are always consistent with those
reported here; that is, the results are robust. Running the logit regressions independently made virtually no
difference. The definitions of the variables used are in Table 1A in the appendix.
– 12 –
Presence of Children
Our model predicts that children are least likely in gay households and most likely
in heterosexual households. The summary statistics in Table 2 confirm this: children are
rare among gay and lesbian households without controlling for household characteristics.
Table 3, column (1) confirms the findings from Table 2. These logit regression results
are based on the full sample, using full controls, robust standard errors, and regression
weights, where the dependent variable is whether or not a child under 18 is present in
the household.35 Although both types of households are less likely to have such children
present, there is a considerable difference between gay and lesbian households. Looking
at the odds ratio, the coefficient for gays means that the odds of having children present
in the home are almost 20 times smaller compared to heterosexual homes. On the other
hand, the odds of lesbians having children are only 42% as large as those for heterosexuals.
This difference is consistent with our prediction that non-heterosexual households are less
likely to include children, and that this effect is stronger among gay households compared
to lesbian households.
Behaviors Non-Complementary With Children
Table 3 investigates a series of behaviors that most would consider non-complementary
with the presence of children: smoking, illegal drug use, and sexual activity with more than
four partners in the past year. Columns (2)–(4) contain selected coefficients from three
regressions, depending on the dependant variable. Each column reports the regression
results for the full sample when all controls, weights, and robust standard errors are used.
Our model predicts that the presence of children should reduce the frequency of these
behaviors, and we find that the presence of children is associated with less smoking, less
illegal drug use, and a lower likelihood of having many sex partners in the past year,
for all three sexual orientations. Furthermore, if gays and lesbians without children are
less likely than childless heterosexuals to expect having children in the future, then our
model also predicts that: (i) on average, childless gays and lesbians should engage in
these behaviors more often than childless heterosexuals; and (ii) the presence of children
should be associated with a larger reduction in the incidence of these behaviors for gays
and lesbians than for heterosexuals, because the difference in expectation between gays
35 Where an individual reports no income, an income is imputed by running a regression of actual income
on age, education (categorical), white, marital status, and presence of children.
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and lesbians that have children and those that do not is larger than the difference for
heterosexuals. Columns (2)–(4) show strong support for these predictions as well.
Taken together, the results from columns (2)–(4) show that childless gays and lesbians
more frequently engage in the three examined types of “non-family-friendly” behavior,
relative to childless heterosexuals.36 However, the results show that while the presence of
children is associated with a lower prevalence of these behaviors for all sexual orientations,
this “child effect” is generally larger for gays and lesbians.
Probability of Marriage Given Health
Our model predicts that heterosexuals with high g’s should be more likely to have
children, and therefore, more likely to marry. Fortunately, the CCHS contains excellent
information on an individual’s self-reported health status. It provides information on
many health problems, but also calculates a health utility index based on vision, speech,
hearing, dexterity, cognition, mobility, or emotional disorders.37 We use this health index
as a measure of biological fitness. Although the health index ranges from negative values
to one, we create a health dummy variable that equals zero if the health index is less than
one, and equals one otherwise.38
Column (5) reports a logit regression on a couple’s choice to marry or cohabit, based on
the full sample, robust standard errors, weighted observations, and controls. The reported
coefficients are the sexual orientation variables, these variables interacted with the health
index fixed effect, and these variables interacted with the child fixed effect. The variables
of interest for matching are the interactive terms of sexual orientation and the health
index. The sorting hypothesis predicts that the interactive terms should only matter for
heterosexuals.39
36 Marginal effects are somewhat ambiguous with nonlinear models with interactions. Evaluated at the
means, the marginal effects of being gay on smoking, drug use, and having more than four sexual partners
are 0.106, 0.038, and 0.021, respectively. The marginal effects of being lesbian on the same dimensions are
0.043, 0.019, and 0.191, respectively.
37 It is reasonable to assume that all of these are exogenous to the institutional decision, with the possible
exception of emotional disorders. Excluding this within a different index makes no effective difference in the
results.
38 We do this to avoid imposing cardinality on our biological measure and introducing measurement error,
since the index does not measure positive health attributes that would lead to higher g’s. However, this
makes almost no difference to the estimates.
39 We use a health fixed effect to avoid measurement error; however, when we use the actual cardinal
index, the results are similar. That is, we find the following odds ratios (t-statistics): Gay × Healthy, 0.44
(−0.59); Lesbian × Healthy, 1.10 (0.11); and Hetero × Healthy, 1.24 (3.03).
– 14 –
Column (5) confirms the summary statistic findings of the first four tables: lesbians
and gay men are significantly less likely to be married relative to cohabitation. In terms
of marriage and biological fitness, the health status of gays appears unrelated to marriage,
and for lesbians is negative — although both estimates are insignificant . On the contrary,
health status matters for heterosexuals. Healthy heterosexuals have odds of marrying that
are 47% higher than the odds for unhealthy heterosexuals, a statistically significant effect
that is much larger than the point estimates for gays and lesbians.40
Assortative Matching
Our model predicts that heterosexual couples should match along biological and re-
productive fitness lines (g), holding constant household traits (h). At the same time,
same-sex couples should not match along g because these couples cannot procreate. The
one weakness of the CCHS data set is that it does not contain health information on the
respondent’s spouse. To resolve this we turn to another data set: the 2006 Canada census.
The 2006 Canada census only identifies same-sex couples (both married and cohabitat-
ing), but it does contain the same information on each spouse. This information includes
a crude measure of health status. In particular, the census asks if the individual has home,
leisure, education, work, or other activities limited due to poor health. The question goes
on to define poor health as a condition resulting from injury, illness, mental illness, and
hereditary diseases. Respondents only have the three options of “never,” “sometimes,”
or “often.” As such, the census health measure is a noisy measure of our g parameter.
Moreover, spousal health also contributes to h, as it generates well-being independently
from reproduction. Therefore, the model does not rule out sorting along the health di-
mension for same-sex couples. Rather, the prediction is that such sorting should be more
pronounced for heterosexual couples due to the importance of biology for the g parameter.
We use the 20% restricted census master file.41 From this file, all couples, either
married or cohabitating, were selected. Statistics Canada does not allow the sample sizes
40 Since marriage may impact health, we have run the regression with only individuals between 18–35, an
age group where marriage is less likely to have yet had an effect on health. The odds ratios (t-statistics)
then become: Gay × Healthy, 0.39 (−1.18); Lesbian × Healthy, 1.08 (0.15); and Hetero × Healthy, 1.42
(8.50). We conduct three other falsification tests using age, income, and education in lieu of health and
interact these variables with sexual orientation. In these cases, the interaction results are often reversed
(and always insignificant for heterosexuals), which suggests that our results are picking up differences in the
costs of having children rather than a cohort or other spurious effects.
41 Like the CCHS, this is not a public use data set, and the separate procedures for access are identical to
those of the CCHS. Empirical work was conducted at the SFU Research Data Center, and all results were
screened by Statistics Canada before release. Statistics Canada does not allow any unweighted observations
or descriptives to be released, nor any maximums or minimums of weighted estimates.
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to be released; however, the weighted estimates of the population based on this sample are:
19,575 lesbian couples; 23,125 gay couples; 1,296,250 cohabitating heterosexual couples;
and 5,920,270 married heterosexual couples.42
Table 4 shows our simple test of assortative matching. Columns (1) – (4) run our
regression selecting samples based on sexual orientation. Column (5) pools the data. The
dependent variable is the ordinal health status of the spouse identified as person 1 in the
census. This is regressed on the health status of this person’s spouse and a host of controls.
In the case of the pooled regression, the health status of person 2 is interacted with sexual
orientation. We report the coefficient on the health status of the spouse and one of the
controls: the presence of children. The results confirm our hypothesis. Gay and lesbian
couples sort less along the health dimension than cohabitating heterosexuals. Heterosexual
married couples sort the most strongly along the health dimension than same-sex couples:
the differences between the coefficients on the spouse’s health are statistically significant.43
Pooling produces identical results. In addition, when children are present in the marriage,
the health status of each spouse is higher for heterosexual couples, but not for same-sex
couples — again, a finding consistent with our model.44
4. Conclusion and Discussion
This paper has exploited two data sets that allow for reliable estimates of demographic
characteristics of different sexual orientations, and for some investigation of lifestyle choices
and mate matching behavior. The model presented ties a series of different behaviors
together and shows how they result from a simple and observable cost difference, which
leads to heterosexuals having a stronger expectation of children than lesbians and gays do.
Other studies, mostly based on small nonrandom samples, have found similar results for
42 As required, these numbers are rounded to the nearest 5. About 85% of the lesbian and gay couples are
cohabitating, and since the results of interest from Table 4 were the same whether same-sex married couples
were separated out or not, we have combined them to make the table simpler.
43 If the census health measure only identified biological traits that could be passed on to children, then
we might expect the health coefficient for same sex couples to be zero. However, it measures general health
status, which is likely to be correlated with our household characteristic. Hence, it is not too surprising that
even same sex couples have a positive health correlation.
44 An alternative explanation for the higher health correlation in heterosexual couples is that it might
be difficult to care simultaneously for children and an ill partner. This would increase the importance of
health for couples with or wanting children for all orientations; the coefficient on partner’s health would still
be higher for heterosexuals since they more frequently have children. However, as observed here, gay and
lesbian couples with children do not exhibit better health than those without, which does not support this
alternative reasoning.
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fertility and non-family behaviors, but none to our knowledge have tied these together with
the matching problem, nor have they used a data set with the qualities of the CCHS.45
An alternative explanation for lower marriage rates among same-sex couples (and,
if marriage and children are complementary as we hypothesize, the lower prevalence of
children in same-sex households) is that, while same-sex marriage is legal in Canada, it
may still be stigmatized, or may simply not have reached a steady state. However, our
model additionally explains differences in matching behavior. Thus, while a higher cost of
marriage for same-sex couples may contribute to some of this paper’s findings, it is neither
necessary nor sufficient for explaining all of them. Our contribution suggests that these
differences are likely to persist in the long run, even after transitory factors vanish, because
they are based on a biological constraint.
One may also worry that our results about behavior non-complementary with chil-
dren may be caused by a selection effect: i) people that are comfortable reporting their
homosexuality may also be more comfortable admitting to sensitive behavior, or ii) our
results stem from older gays who were unable to marry. While we cannot completely
rule out either effect, we make several observations that alleviate these concerns. First,
same-sex households with children are not more likely than heterosexual households with
children in reporting such behavior. Second, our matching results show that differences in
non-sensitive behavior occur, so it appears plausible that differences in sensitive behavior
would occur as well. Finally, we ran our regressions without the older gays and found
similar results.
In the end, we have provided a simple and plausible model of household behavior that
explains a wide range of behavior differences across couples of different sexual orientation,
which are documented by our empirical work. We do not claim that our model is the
only explanation for these correlations, as we have not established causality. However, we
have demonstrated that a parsimonious model based on a single fundamental difference
— in procreation and childrearing costs — can generate the many differences in behavior
that are observed. Other factors may well contribute to the magnitude of these effects,
but do not tie all these phenomena together. We leave it to future work to compare the
importance of various explanations.
45 An exception would be Alde`n et al. (2015). They use an excellent data set and exploit differences in
the ability to reproduce, the explore fertility and income differences across sexual orientation. They do not
examine the matching issue, however.
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TABLE 2: Population Estimates of Household Characteristics
Weighted Observations
Heterosexual Gay Lesbian
Characteristic Household Household Household
% of Population 97.79 .57 .32
% HH with children <18 24.7 2.37 10.3
% Married 48.4 9.8 14.5
% Single 29.2 59.7 43.2
Avg. HH Income 80,748 86,301 76,805
% Homeowners 74.7 55.7 63.0
% White 84.0 88.7 92.2
% Smokers 15.7 25.8 20.2
% Health 53.7 47.8 47.6
% High School 76.4 96.2 95.1
% Graduate Work 9.9 17.5 14.1
# of Sex Partners in past 12
months, if at least one
% One 85.29 55.52 83.22
% Two 7.91 14.67 11.41
% Three 3.38 8.95 2.35
% Four + 3.42 20.86 3.02
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TABLE 3 Children, Non-Complementary Behaviors, & Marriage
SUR Logit Regressions
Variable Children Smoking Illegal More Than 4 Marriage
Drug Use Sex Partners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gay coefficient −3.08 0.68 0.58 1.10 −1.97
Gay odds ratio 0.05 1.99 1.79 3.02 0.14
(−5.88)∗ (4.65)∗ (2.61)∗ (4.00)∗ (−6.58)∗
Lesbian coefficient −0.86 0.32 0.33 3.02 −2.04
Lesbian odds ratio 0.42 1.37 1.39 22.81 0.13
(−2.73)∗ (1.54) (1.57) (2.10)∗ (−8.59)∗
Gay× Children −1.35 −2.21 −0.91 2.05
Gay× Children odds ratio 0.26 0.11 0.40 7.77
(−2.18)∗ (−2.13)∗ (−1.01) (3.35)∗
Lesbian× Children −0.94 0.15 −2.32 0.51
Lesbian× Children odds ratio 0.39 1.16 0.17 1.67
(−2.36)∗ (0.30) (−3.71) (0.97)
Children −0.39 −0.05 −0.66 0.66
Children odds ratio 0.97 0.95 0.51 1.95
(1.15) (1.37) (−8.54)∗ (24.58)∗
Lesbian × Healthy 0.04
odds ratio 1.03
(0.11)
Gay × Healthy −0.31
odds ratio 0.73
(−0.80)
Heterosexual × Healthy 0.38
odds ratio 1.47
(14.83)∗
N 351,890 351,890 351,890 106,788 199,891
Log Likelihood −7, 416, 475 −7, 446.865 −4, 208, 411 −872, 623 −5, 102, 258
Pseudo R2 0.27 .04 .05 0.18 0.16
* Significant at the 5% level. t-statistics in parentheses.
Controls: Age, Year, White, Income, Urban, Graduate Work, Obesity, Children (except in (1)), Mar-
riage, and the sexual orientation health interactions.
SUR uses weighted observations and robust standard errors.
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TABLE 4: OLS Regressions for Assortative Matching
Dependent Variable: Spouse 1 Health
Gay Lesbian Heterosexual Heterosexual Pooled
Couples Couples Common Law Married Sample
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spouse 2
Health 0.29 0.33 0.37 0.42
(12.08)∗ (13.31)∗ (98.71)∗ (487.36)∗
Gay× Health 0.28
(12.06)∗
Lesbian × Health 0.33
(13.29)∗
Common Law × Health 0.37
(102.61)∗
Married × Health 0.42
(301.59)∗
Children −0.04 −0.02 0.01 0.005 −0.0009
(−0.98) (−0.81) (7.00)∗ (4.46)∗ (−0.89)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted obs. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 23,125 19,575 1,296,250 5,920,270 7,259,220
R2 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.29 0.96
* Significant at the 5% level. t-statistics in parentheses.
Controls: Age, White, Rooms, Education, Ethnicity, Province, Citizenship, Value, Urban Size, Work.
For the pooled regression the CONSTANT is interacted with the family type fixed effect as well.
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Appendix A
TABLE 1A: Definitions of Variables
Canadian Community Health Survey
Variable Name Definition
Gay = 1 if respondent self-identified as gay.
Lesbian = 1 if respondent self-identified as lesbian
Bi-sexual male = 1if respondent self-identified as male bi-sexual
Bi-sexual female = 1if respondent self-identified as male bi-sexual
Age = age in years.
Year = year of survey, either 2005, 2007, 2008, or 2009.
White = 1 if respondent was white.
Smoking = 1 if respondent was a daily smoker, and had smoked more than 100 cigs. in life.
Income = self reported income of respondent.
Urban = 1 if respondent lived in urban area.
Obesity = 1 if body mass index was greater than 30.
Children = 1 if any child in household was less than 18.
Health = 1 if respondent had no serious health problems.
Graduate Work = 1 if respondent had completed graduate degree.
High School = 1 if respondent graduated from high school.
Drug Use = 1 if the respondent has used marijuana, cocaine,
speed, ecstasy, hallucinogens, glue, or heroin
Health Index = 1 if person suffered from vision, speech, hearing,
dexterity, cognition, mobility, or emotional disorders.
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TABLE 2A: Definitions of Variables
2006 Canada Census
Variable Name Definition
Spouse 1 Health = 1 if poor health often prohibits job, school, or other activities.
= 2 if poor health sometimes prohibits job, school, or other activities.
= 3 if poor health never prohibits job, school, or other activities.
Spouse 2 Health = same as Spouse 1 Health.
Children = 1 if children are present in home.
Age1 = age of spouse 1.
Age2 = age of spouse 2.
Education1 = highest grade achieved by spouse 1.
Education2 = highest grade achieved by spouse 2.
Ethnicity1 = ordinal ethnic category for spouse 1.
Ethnicity2 = ordinal ethnic category for spouse 2.
Citizen1 = 1 if spouse 1 is Canadian citizen.
Citizen2 = 1 if spouse 2 is Canadian citizen.
White1 = 1 if spouse 1 is white.
White2 = 1 if spouse 2 is white.
Work1 = number of weeks worked in 2005 for spouse 1.
Work2 = number of weeks worked in 2005 for spouse 2.
Rooms = number of rooms in residence.
Value = value of residence.
Province = ordinal value for province.
Urban Size = population of rural/urban district.
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1. Introduction
In order to meet the page limit restrictions of the journal, the full theoretical model
has been moved to this online appendix. After the full model, we present some robustness
tests from empirical results based on restricted samples.
2. The Full Model of Marriage, Children, and Matching
We present a stylized model of matching in which the key feature is a difference in the
cost of children across three different sexual orientations: heterosexual, gay, and lesbian.1
We assume that members of each group only match with members from the same group,
all pregnancies are planned, and only couples (married or not) have children (no single
parents). Individuals are initially randomly paired in a “date” and incur a search cost
k > 0. Later they decide if they want to be a couple, and once a couple, they decide if
they want to marry and/or to have children. Individuals can reject a date and go back
to the dating pool, but once a person is coupled, they remain so. In addition, we assume
that spouses have the same preferences over children and marriage and that there are
no transfers, which allows for an abstraction of bargaining issues within a household and
allows a focus on cost differences in conception, pregnancy, and child rearing between the
different couple types.
Every type of individual is described by two traits (gi, hi) distributed according to
a positive density on [0, G] × [0, H]. The trait gi is a quality index related to biological
reproduction: it accounts for genetic features such as expected longevity, health, fertility
and other features that could be passed on to children, and also accounts for an individual’s
reproductive fitness. The trait hi is an index of characteristics such as education, talent,
etc. that produce non-child household production. A component of every potential match
payoff is hij = m(hi, hj), where m is increasing in hi and hj , that measures the utility
of household production independent of children or marriage. We do not assume that g
is independent of h. Therefore, our model could easily accommodate characterisics that
1 We abstract from the fact that some agents may be able to choose between the same-sex and the
heterosexual markets. Many of these individuals would self-identify as bi-sexual, which are excluded from our
empirical analysis and a small part of the sample. Furthermore, these individuals face the same constraints
on procreation as others in whichever market they choose.
contribute to both traits: for example, intelligence may be genetically passed on, and may
also produce non-child related household production.2
Stage Play
There are three stages of play to the matching game.
Stage 1: Singles are randomly paired in a dating market at cost k > 0.
Stage 2: Each person i decides if he wants to break up after observing the other
person’s gj and their hij . Coupling is mutual, so either can break the date and
return to stage 1.
Stage 3: Each couple cij that remains together now observes c ∈ <, their suitabil-
ity for marriage, and decides whether to marry, and how many children to have.3
We assume that c is independent of all other variables and distributed according
to a continuous cumulative distribution function. We do not, however, constrain its
sign: some couples may prefer the status and institutional protections of marriage,
while others may prefer the flexibility of remaining unmarried.
Person i has the following separable utility function over children and household pro-
duction when matched with person j:
Uij = vij + hij ,
=
{
[γ(gi, gj) +Mc − s− fc + cMc] + hij if children
cMc + hij if no children
(1)
Note that vij captures the utility related to marriage and children, and hij captures all
other household utility. The sub-utility function vij has a number of components. First,
γ(gi, gj) is the expected utility of children, conditional on the genetic attributes of the
couple. We assume that γ(gi, gj) = max{a, b(gi, gj)}, where a is the expected utility from
adopting, and b is the expected utility from having own biological children.4 For same-sex
couples, option b is unavailable because we ignore surrogacy and alternative insemination
2 The closest one-dimensional counterpart to the matching portion of our model is Morgan (1998). Atakan
(2006) studies a similar model, but with transferable utility. Both papers obtain assortative matching if
surplus is super-modular in matched types.
3 To simplify notation, we drop the subscripts for couple cij . Couples are assumed to have the optimal
number of children if they have any.
4 Even assuming that all heterosexuals rear their own biological children, there can be a supply of children
for adoption from various sources, such as parent deaths and foreign countries.
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options for all couples — this is not a critical assumption.5 We assume b is increasing in
both arguments; that is gi and gj both improve child quality.
Second, Mc is an indicator variable for being married. Marriage is understood to
be an institution that increases the value of children — either by raising the quality of
children, lowering the costs of raising them, or maintaining the marriage in stressful times.
We normalize the value of this increase to 1.6 The variable s is the value of foregone
consumption that results from having children. This is the value of consumption activities
that are not complementary with children and which are sacrificed when children arrive.
Finally, our critical variable is fc, the extra cost of having children for same-sex couples.
These are the extra costs of parenting that might arise in a same-sex relationship.7 We
assume that these costs are greater for gays than for lesbians; that is, fGay > fLesbian >
fHetero = 0.
8 9
Table 1 shows the four possible utility outcomes once a pairing decides to be a couple
(subscripts have been suppressed).
Table 1
Individual Marriage and Child Payoffs
No Children Children
Cohabiting (A): h (C): h+ γ − s− fc
Married (B): h+ c (D): h+ c + γ + 1− s− fc
5 Introducing surrogacy and other options to the model strengthens our results – gays and lesbians with
higher g would care less about their partner’s g because only the higher g would be used – but adds
complexity. Hence, we ignore them.
6 It has been suggested that some benefits of marriage, such as companionship, may be more valuable
to childless couples, so that marriage and children may be substitutes in certain ways. However, it appears
reasonable to assume that, overall, marriage and children are complements (Alde`n et al., 2015). Therefore,
one may interpret this “1” as the net amount by which marriage increases the value of children.
7 As discussed in the introduction, these costs of parenting might arise from the inability (or reduced abil-
ity) to have a sexual division of labor; that is, “mothering” and “fathering” might be imperfect substitutes.
They might also arise from stigma and discrimination against same-sex couples and their children.
8 Surrogacy is also significantly more costly than insemination, so including these options would strengthen
our fGay > fLesbian assumption.
9 More realistically, one could assume fc to be stochastic, and that the distributions by sexual orientation
are ranked by first-order stochastic dominance. Doing so does not qualitatively impact any of our propositions
and corollaries.
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No outcome dominates the others, and which outcome is chosen depends on the cou-
ple’s specific values of the various utility components. The difference in utility between
cohabitation with children (option (C)) and marriage with children (option (D)) is 1 + c.
The utility difference between cohabitation and marriage without children is just c. These
values may be greater or less than zero depending on the couples suitability for marriage.
The difference in utility between married couples with children and married couples with-
out children is γ + 1 − s − fc, which can also be greater or less than zero. As a result,
different couple combinations will choose different outcomes with respect to marriage and
children.
Incentive to To Marry and Have Children
Because we assume that c is observed after a dating pair becomes a couple in stage
3 and is independent of g and h, every same-sex couple has the same probability of mar-
riage.10 We show that the probability of marriage is weakly greater for every heterosexual
couple, regardless of the couple’s gi and gj . It is strictly greater when not all same-sex
couples adopt and at least some heterosexual couples have children. This is stated in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Same-sex couples are no more likely to marry than heterosexual couples,
and they are strictly less likely to do so than a heterosexual couple with genetic traits
(gi, gj) when s > a− fLesbian and s < max{a, b(gi, gj)}+ 1.11
Proof of Proposition 1
All couples who do not have biological children, both same-sex and opposite-sex, will
marry if and only if (up to measure zero indifference cases)
c >

0 if fc + s ≥ a+ 1, (i.e. couple never adopts)
fc + s− a− 1 if a ≤ fc + s < a+ 1, (i.e. couple adopts if married)
−1 if fc + s < a, (i.e. couple always adopts).
(2)
10 This is not true for heterosexual couples because their decision whether to have children, which impacts
the value of marriage, may depend on the genetic attributes gi, gj . Hence, different heterosexual couples will
have a different threshold for c.
11 These conditions are most likely to hold when a is low relative to b(gi, gj), which implies a high cost of
adoption.
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Because the right-hand side is independent of g and h, all couples of a given sexual orien-
tation will have the same probability of marrying. That is, all gay couples have the same
probability of marriage, all lesbian couples have the same probability, and all heterosex-
ual couples that do not have biological children have the same probability. However, the
probability of marriage is always weakly greater for heterosexual couples than gay and
lesbian couples because the right hand side, the net cost of marriage, is weakly smaller for
heterosexual couples.
For the marriage probability to be strictly greater for heterosexual couples, we need
s < a + 1 so that some heterosexual couples adopt, and fLesbian + s > a, so that some
same-sex couples do not adopt. If no heterosexual couples adopt or if all same-sex couples
do adopt, then right-hand side of equation (2) is the same regardless of sexual orientation.
Couples who choose to have biological children have an even greater probability of
marriage since their value of having children is b(gi, gj) > a.
Corollary 1. Lesbian couples are at least as likely to marry as gay couples, and more so
if a− fGay < s < a+ 1− fLesbian.
Proof of Corollary 1
Use the same reasoning as in the first half of the proof of Proposition 1, and the
assumption that fGay > fLesbian.
Corollary 2. Heterosexual couples are at least as likely to have children as lesbian couples,
which are in turn at least as likely to do so as gay couples. These relations are strict as
long as a− fLesbian < s < a+ 1− fLesbian, so that some, but not all lesbian couples adopt.
Proof of Corollary 2
This is a direct consequence of Proposition 1, Corollary 1, the fact that marriage
increases the utility from having children, and fGay > fLesbian > 0.
Proposition 1 and its corollaries are rather intuitive. Consider an increase in fc to f
′
c,
all else equal. Couples who would have chosen no children before the change do not change
their behavior because fc is not in their payoff function. Couples who would have chosen
children with cohabitation reveal that γ − s − fc > 0, and an increase in fc means that
those at the margin will now decide to have no children. Finally, couples who would have
chosen marriage with children under the original cost will now continue with (D) or choose
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(A) or (B), depending on how close they are to indifference between having children or
not.12
In other words, an increase in the cost of children will lead some couples to forego
having children, and some of these couples will also forego marriage as a result. No couple
changes its decision in the opposite direction. Since fGay > fLesbian > 0, all other attributes
equal, gay couples should be the least likely to have children because fc is greatest for them,
followed by lesbian couples, and finally heterosexual couples.13
Corollary 3. Gay couples are at least as likely to engage in behaviors not complementary
with children as lesbian couples, which in turn are at least as likely as heterosexual couples
to engage in non-complementary behaviors.
Proof of Corollary 3
This is a direct consequence of Corollary 2.
Another intuitive result follows from the model:
Corollary 4. Suppose couples A and B have genetic traits (gi, gj) and (g
′
i, g
′
j), respectively,
with gi > g
′
i, gj ≥ g′j , and b(gi, gj) > a. Then if the couples are heterosexual, couple A
is more likely to marry than couple B, while if they are same-sex, they have the same
probability of marriage.
Proof of Corollary 4
Given the assumptions, for heterosexuals, we have γg > 0, so couple A has a higher γ
than couple B. This is equivalent to facing a lower f , so by the same logic as Proposition
1, couple 1 is more likely to marry. For gays and lesbians, γ = a does not depend on g.
Matching Behavior
We now examine matching behavior for different sexual orientations. We focus on
stationary situations (which we call threshold equilibria) where each type’s reservation
utility remains constant. We assume that individuals leaving the dating pool are replaced
by individuals with the same characteristics. First, we show that same-sex matching
12 Note that they do not choose to cohabitate with children (option C) because they have revealed 1+c > 0,
and this does not depend on fc.
13 If fc is not driven completely by biology, and depends in part on social stigma and discrimination, then
this effect would be reduced over time as such stigma is reduced.
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occurs independently from g. This implies that any correlation in g between same-sex
partners should disappear once we control for h. Then, we show that this is not the
case for heterosexuals. Indeed, under the assumption that b(.) is super-modular in its
arguments, heterosexual sorting should have assortative characteristics (defined later) in
the g dimension, even controlling for h.14
We use the following definitions:
Let Ui(gj , hj) be the expected utility of person i, with characteristics (gi, hi), coupling with
a partner of type (gj , hj), prior to observing c. That is, Ui(gj , hj) is the expectation of
Uij maximized over the child and marriage decisions.
A stationary strategy profile σ is a threshold equilibrium if there exists a collection of utility
thresholds Uσ(gi, hi) such that each type (gi, hi) accepts couple with type (gj , hj) if and
only if Ui(gj , hj) ≥ Uσ(gi, hi), and in doing so, maximizes their expected utility.
In addition, in a threshold equilibrium σ, let:
Aσ(gi, hi) = {(gj , hj) : Ui(gj , hj) ≥ Uσ(gi, hi)} be the set of types that (gi, hi) accepts,
Bσ(gi, hi) = {(gj , hj) : Uj(gi, hi) ≥ Uσ(gj , hj)} be the set of types that accept (gi, hi).15
Note that due to the search cost k, type (gi, hi) may “settle” (accept a type even though
better ones exist in Bσ(gi, hi)), even in the absence of transfers, as is the case here.
Same-Sex Matching
Proposition 2. In any threshold equilibrium σ for same-sex couples, for all g, g′ ∈ [0, G]
and all h ∈ [0, H], Bσ(g, h) = Bσ(g′, h) and Aσ(g, h) = Aσ(g′, h).
Proof of Proposition 2:
Since gays and lesbians only care about h, Bσ(g, h) = Bσ(g′, h) for all h. Therefore,
(g, h) and (g′, h), which have the same preferences, must have the same threshold, so
Aσ(g, h) = Aσ(g′, h).
14 As discussed by Chiappori, McCann and Neishem (2010), there is no straightforward way to generalize
the concept of assortative matching to multiple dimensions. We will simply show that, in our setting,
equilibria exhibit characteristics suggesting that heterosexuals with higher g (holding h fixed) tend to have
partners with higher g. This is the hypothesis that we will take to the data.
15 As usual, Aσ(gi, hi) = B
σ(gi, hi) = ∅ is a trivial equilibrium. We will restrict our attention to other
equilibria.
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Therefore, conditional on hi, the expected g of individual i’s partner in a same-sex
couple is independent of gi. In other words, the genetic fitness of same-sex partners should
be uncorrelated, conditional on h. This will not be true in general for heterosexual couples
because their genetic fitness is passed on to their own offspring.
Heterosexual Matching
For our study of heterosexual matching, we assume that b(.) is super-modular; that
is, if gi > g
′
i and gj > g
′
j , then b(gi, gj) + b(g
′
i, g
′
j) > b(gi, g
′
j) + b(g
′
i, gj). For example,
individuals with high g may place greater value on their children having high g because
they do not want their children to face difficulties that they did not face. Alternatively,
if parents are risk-averse with respect to the quality of genes passed on to the child, then
it is more important for an individual with high g to have a partner with high g (so that
good genes are passed on for sure) than for an individual with a low g.
Under the above assumption, we show that heterosexuals with higher g will be more
selective than individuals with lower g when considering partners with low g. This points
to assortativeness along the g dimension for heterosexual matching.
Recall from equation (1) that the utility function is separable in genetic and household
characteristics. We denote the expectation of vij (before observing c) as v(gi, gj). Taking
the expectation of equation (1) gives: Ui(gj , hj) = hij +v(gi, gj). Therefore, v(gi, gj) is the
expected utility from marriage and/or children, over and above the utility from coupling.
Lemma 1. v(gi, gj) is super-modular: if gi > g
′
i and gj > g
′
j , then v(gi, gj) − v(gi, g′j) ≥
v(g′i, gj)−v(g′i, g′j). Moreover, if v(gi, gj)−v(gi, g′j) > 0, then v(gi, gj)−v(gi, g′j) > v(g′i, gj)−
v(g′i, g
′
j).
Proof of Lemma 1:
Because γ(gi, gj) = max{a, b(gi, gj)}, we have: γ(gi, gj) − γ(gi, g′j) ∈ {b(gi, gj) −
b(gi, g
′
j), b(gi, gj)− a, 0}. Thus, γ(gi, gj)− γ(gi, g′j) ≤ b(gi, gj)− b(gi, g′j). Therefore:
If γ(gi, gj)−γ(gi, g′j) = b(gi, gj)−b(gi, g′j), then γ(g′i, gj)−γ(g′i, g′j) ≤ b(g′i, gj)−b(g′i, g′j) <
b(gi, gj)− b(gi, g′j) = γ(gi, gj)− γ(gi, g′j).
If γ(gi, gj) − γ(gi, g′j) = b(gi, gj) − a > 0, then, because b1 > 0, γ(g′i, gj) − γ(g′i, g′j) =
max{b(g′i, gj)− a, 0} < b(gi, gj)− a = γ(gi, gj)− γ(gi, g′j).
If γ(gi, gj)− γ(gi, g′j) = 0, then clearly γ(g′i, gj)− γ(g′i, g′j) = 0.
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Thus, γ(gi, gj)− γ(gi, g′j) ≥ γ(g′i, gj)− γ(g′i, g′j).
Therefore, even with the same probability of child rearing, type gi would benefit weakly
more than type g′i from increasing the genetic type of her partner. Furthermore, for any
given type of the partner, type gi is weakly more likely than type g
′
i to have children. Thus,
v(gi, gj)− v(g′i, gj) ≥ v(gi, g′j)− v(g′i, g′j).
If v(gi, gj)− v(gi, g′j) > 0, then it must be that γ(gi, gj)− γ(gi, g′j) 6= 0. The argument
above shows that γ(gi, gj)−γ(gi, g′j) > γ(g′i, gj)−γ(g′i, g′j). Moreover, if v(gi, gj)−v(gi, g′j) >
0, then it must be that a couple with genetic traits gi, gj has a strictly positive probability
of having children. Therefore, v(gi, gj)− v(g′i, gj) > v(gi, g′j)− v(g′i, g′j).
Lemma 1 shows that if, as we assume, the expected utility from biological children
b(., .) is super-modular, then the expected utility of marriage and children v(., .) is weakly
super-modular. The argument is simple: if b(., .) is super-modular, then the expected
utility from children γ(., .) must be weakly super-modular. Adding marriage into the mix
does not change this fact because marriage and children are complementary.
The super-modularity of v leads to result below. To avoid confusion between specific
own type and a generic partner’s type, we denote the partner’s type as (x, y), where x
is the genetic trait, and y is the household trait. Moreover, we assume that for every gi,
v(gi, G) − v(gi, 0) > 0. That is, every heterosexual cares about the genetic trait of their
partner at least to some extent.
Proposition 3. If g > g′, then in any threshold equilibrium σ for heterosexual couples,
for all h, we have Bσ(g, h) ⊇ Bσ(g′, h), and there exists g∗ > 0 such that:
– if x < g∗ and (x, y) ∈ Aσ(g, h), then (x, y) ∈ Aσ(g′, h); and
– as long as type (g, h) has biological children with positive probability, there exists
a positive measure of types (x, y) with x < g∗ such that (x, y) /∈ Aσ(g, h), but (x, y) ∈
Aσ(g′, h).
Proof of Proposition 3:
Denote type (gj , hj)’s utility from being matched with type (g, h) as Ugj ,hj (g, h). Since
g > g′, we have Ugj ,hj (g, h) ≥ Ugj ,hj (g′, h) for all (gj , hj). It follows that Bσ(g, h) ⊇
Bσ(g′, h).
Case 1: The boundaries of Aσ(g, h) and Aσ(g′, h) cross. It follows from the discussion
about indifference curves in the main text that they must cross at only one type. Letting
g∗ be this type’s genetic characteristic yields the desired result.
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Case 2: Aσ(g, h) ⊆ Aσ(g′, h). Here, we must simply show that Aσ(g, h) and Aσ(g′, h)
must differ by a set of positive measure. Due to the assumption that every gi, v(gi, G) −
v(gi, 0) > 0, Lemma 1 implies that v(g,G)− v(g, 0) > v(g′, G)− v(g′, 0). Thus, no indiffer-
ence curve for any type can be flat across the entire type space. Again, by the discussion
about indifference curves in the main text, the boundary of Aσ(g, h) must be strictly
steeper than the boundary of Aσ(g′, h) in some range.
Case 3: Aσ(g′, h) ⊂ Aσ(g, h). The rest of the proof shows that this case cannot arise
if type (g, h) has a positive probability of having biological children.
In a threshold equilibrium, we must have:
∫
Aσ(g,h)∩Bσ(g,h)
[Ug,h(x, y)− Uσ(g, h)]dF (x, y) = k
=
∫
Aσ(g′,h)∩Bσ(g′,h)
[Ug′,h(x, y)− Uσ(g′, h)]dF (x, y).
Define L = Aσ(g, h) ∩Bσ(g, h) and L′ = Aσ(g′, h) ∩Bσ(g′, h). Recall that Bσ(g, h) ⊇
Bσ(g′, h). Thus, if Aσ(g′, h) ⊂ Aσ(g, h), it must be that L′ ⊆ L. Since Ug,h(x, y) −
Uσ(g, h) > 0 for all (x, y) ∈ Aσ(g, h), it follows that:
∫
L′
[Ug,h(x, y)− Uσ(g, h)]dF (x, y) ≤
∫
L
[Ug,h(x, y)− Uσ(g, h)]dF (x, y) = k
Thus,∫
L′
[Ug,h(x, y)− Uσ(g, h)]dF (x, y) ≤ k =
∫
L′
[Ug′,h(x, y)− Uσ(g′, h)]dF (x, y),
and therefore,
∫
L′[v(g, x)− v(g′, x)]dF (x, y)∫
L′ dF (x, y)
≤ Uσ(g, h)− Uσ(g′, h). (B1)
Let x be the lowest x such that there exists y for which (x, y) ∈ Aσ(g, h). Let y
be this y, so that Ug,h(x, y) = U
σ(g, h). Since Aσ(g′, h) ⊂ Aσ(g, h), it must be that
Ug′,h(x, y) ≤ Uσ(g′, h). Then we have:
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Uσ(g, h)− Uσ(g′, h) ≤ Ug,h(x, y)− Ug′,h(x, y) = v(g, x)− v(g′, x). (B2)
Combining equations B1 and B2 gives:
∫
L′[v(g, x)− v(g′, x)]dF (x, y)∫
L′ dF (x, y)
≤ v(g, x)− v(g′, x). (B3)
Since g > g′ and all (x, y) ∈ Aσ(g′, h) must have x ≥ x, it follows from Lemma 1
that v(g, x) − v(g′, x) ≥ v(g, x) − v(g′, x). Therefore, for B3 to hold, it must be that
v(g, x)− v(g′, x) = v(g, x)− v(g′, x) for almost all types (x, y) ∈ Aσ(g′, h) ∩Bσ(g′, h). By
the second half of Lemma 1, this means that v(g, x)− v(g, x) = 0. This implies that type
(g, h) does not care about the genetic trait of its partner, which means that it will not
have biological children.
This proposition states that for heterosexuals, if individual 1 has a higher g and the
same h as individual 2, then individual 1 is acceptable to (weakly) more types, and is weakly
more selective (requires equal or higher y) among partners with a low x. Furthermore, if
individual 1 has biological children with positive probability, individual 1 is strictly more
selective than individual 2 among partners that have a low x, and the additional low x
types that individual 1 rejects as a result form a nonzero fraction of the population.
To understand the intuition for this result, note that the boundary of Aσ(g, h) must be
one of type (g, h)’s indifference curves. Figure 1 shows an example of indifference curves
for types (g, h) and (g′, h), where g > g′, plotted on a plane with the partner’s genetic trait
on the horizontal axis and the partner’s household trait on the vertical axis.
Consider the indifference curve for either “high” type (g, h) or “low” type (g′, h). For
low values of x, the benefits from adopting children are greater than from procreation, and
the indifference curves remain flat: the genetic trait x has no value in this region. Once
b > a, the indifference curves start to fall because one type is willing to substitute x and y
in a partner. This occurs sooner for high type (g, h) than for low type (g′, h) since g > g′.
Moreover, by Lemma 1, whenever the marginal utility of x for high type (g, h) is nonzero,
it is greater than the marginal utility of x for low type (g′, h). Hence, whenever it is not
flat, high type (g, h)’s indifference curve at a given (x, y) is strictly steeper than low type
(g′, h)’s at the same (x, y).16
16 The downward sloping part of the indifference curves need not be concave as depicted.
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Figure 1: Example of Matching Boundary Conditions
Consider a potential mate given by point 1 in the graph. High type (g, h) would reject
this person as a match because they fall below their indifference curve boundary. On the
other hand, low type (g′, h) would accept this person as a mate. Now consider another
potential mate given by point 2. This person has a higher x and lower y than the person at
point 1. Now high type (g, h) finds this person acceptable, while low type (g′, h) does not.
The reason is found in Lemma 1: the supermodularity of expected utility in the genetic
trait means that point 2’s high genetic trait matters more to high type (g, h) than to low
type (g′, h).
Figure 1 is one example of the how the boundary conditions might look for types (g, h)
and (g′, h). There are actually three cases to consider:
1. The indifference curves corresponding to the lowest acceptable utility cross, as depicted
in Figure 1. In this case, type (g, h) is less selective than type (g′, h) among partners
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with high x. Since type (g, h) is more selective among partners with low x, matching
along the genetic dimension has assortative properties.
2. Type (g, h) is more selective than type (g′, h) among partners of all x. If we assume
that hij is log-separable in hi and hj , then even with different partners, types (g, h)
and (g′, h) have the same marginal utility for y. In this case, type (g, h) has a steeper
boundary of acceptable types, which again suggests assortative matching.
3. Type (g, h) is less selective than type (g′, h) among partners of all x. The proof of
Proposition 3 shows that this is not possible because type (g, h) is more willing to
wait for a partner of higher genetic quality than type (g′, h), and because type (g, h)
is acceptable to more types than type (g′, h).
Summary of the Model’s Predictions
Our model delivers the following testable implications.17
1. Non-heterosexuals are less likely to marry and less likely to have children.
2. Among non-heterosexuals, gays are less likely to marry and less likely to have children
compared to lesbians.
3. Non-heterosexual couples are more likely to engage in the consumption of goods that
are non-complementary with children, not controlling for the presence of children.
4. Heterosexuals should be more likely to marry and less likely to cohabitate as their g
increases. No such relationship should exist for gays and lesbians.
5. Conditional on h, non-heterosexuals should not sort for mates along genetic lines, but
there should be positive assortative matching for heterosexuals on genetic lines.
These differences in predicted behavior arise without positing any difference in prefer-
ences, marriage market conditions, costs of marriage, or type distributions across sexual
orientations. Instead, they all occur due to simple variations across orientations in the
availability of means of conception and/or the cost of having children. More complicated
models are possible, but our goal is to examine if differences in the costs of children can
explain differences in behavior between couples of different orientations.18
17 These predictions would hold for other types of couples who, ex ante, would be predicted to have high
costs of procreation. For example, these predictions would apply to couples that are elderly at the time of
matching or infertile. Unfortunately, the data set used here does not allow the identification of such couples.
18 A model based on differences in preferences (ie., gays and lesbians have a smaller demand for children)
will lead to the same predictions as this model because the effect on the shadow price of children would be
the same (see Pollak and Wachter (1975)).
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3. Robustness Results
3.1. The Data
3.2. Behaviors Non-Complementary With Children
Tables 1S to 4S replicate the tests conducted in Table 3 of the paper. Here we restrict
the sample to men and women separately, and reproduce the results with differing controls.
The last column of each set of regressions reproduces the results from the paper. The
definitions of the variables are the same as in the paper.
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TABLE 1S Smoking Behavior
Logit Regression
Variable Males Females Full
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gay coefficient 0.47 0.55 0.68
Gay odds ratio 1.60 1.74 1.99
(5.86)∗ (3.76)∗ (4.65)∗
Lesbian coefficient 0.39 0.43 0.32
Lesbian odds ratio 1.48 1.54 1.37
(3.38)∗ (2.06)∗ (1.54)
Gay× Children −1.29 −1.35
Gay× Children odds ratio 0.27 0.26
(−2.10)∗ (−2.18)∗
Lesbian× Children −0.98 −0.94
Lesbian× Children odds ratio 0.37 0.39
(−2.43)∗ (−2.36)∗
Children −0.04 0.03 −0.39
Children odds ratio 0.96 1.03 0.97
(−1.26) (1.00) (−1.15)
Exogenous Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Weighted observations Yes Yes Yes
Robust Std. Errors Yes Yes Yes
N 216,455 165,779 259,941 186,111 351,890
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03
* Significant at the 5% level. t-statistics in parentheses.
Exogenous Controls: Age, Year, White. Other Controls: Income, Urban, Graduate Work, Obesity,
Children, Marriage, and the sexual orientation health interactions.
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TABLE 2S Illegal Drug Use
Logit Regression
Variable Males Females Full
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gay coefficient 0.51 0.46 0.58
Gay Odds Ratio 1.66 1.59 1.79
(4.16)∗ (2.08)∗ (2.61)∗
Lesbian coefficient 0.74 0.45 0.33
Lesbian Odds Ratio 2.10 1.57 1.39
(5.99)∗ (2.11)∗ (1.57)
Gay× Children −2.22 −2.21
Gay× Children odds ratio 0.10 0.11
(−2.14)∗ (−2.13)∗
Lesbian× Children −0.18 0.15
Lesbian× Children odds ratio 0.86 1.16
(−0.06) (0.30)
Children −0.23 −0.21 −0.05
Children odds ratio 0.79 0.81 0.95
(−4.30)∗ (−3.62)∗ (−1.37)∗
Exogenous Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Weighted observations Yes Yes Yes
Robust Std. Errors Yes Yes Yes
N 137,918 102,378 164,185 112,266 214,644
Log Likelihood −2, 527, 473 −1, 927, 439 −2, 019, 022 −1, 494, 923 −3, 433, 477
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14
* Significant at the 5% level. t-statistics in parentheses.
Exogenous Controls: Age, Year, White. Other Controls: Income, Urban, Graduate Work, Obesity,
Children, Married, and the sexual orientation health interactions.
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TABLE 3S More Than Four Sex Partners
Logit Regression
Variable Males Females Full
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gay coefficient 1.86 0.93 1.10
Gay Odds Ratio 6.44 2.52 3.02
(12.88)∗ (3.28)∗ (4.00)∗
Lesbian coefficient 1.18 3.48 3.02
Lesbian Odds Ratio 3.22 32.6 22.81
(2.07)∗ (2.30)∗ (2.10)∗
Gay× Children −0.90 −0.91
Gay× Children odds ratio 0.40 0.40
(−1.00) (−1.01)
Lesbian× Children −1.61 −2.32
Lesbian× Children odds ratio 0.29 0.17
(−1.37) (−3.71)∗
Children −0.55 −0.54 −0.66
Children odds ratio 0.57 0.58 0.51
(−5.95)∗ (−4.53)∗ (−8.54)∗
Exogenous Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Weighted observations Yes Yes Yes
Robust Std. Errors Yes Yes Yes
N 64,626 54,639 73,648 59,397 106,788
Log Likelihood −804, 617 −720, 213 −342, 582 −289, 271 −1, 044, 123
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.16 0.18
* Significant at the 5% level. t-statistics in parentheses.
Exogenous Controls: Age, Year, White. Other Controls: Income, Urban, Graduate Work, Obesity,
Children, Married, and the sexual orientation health interactions.
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TABLE 4S: Logit Regressions for Marriage vs Cohabitation
Males Females Full Sample
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Now Married
Gay coefficient −1.72 −1.76 −1.97
Gay odds ratio 0.17 0.17 0.14
(−7.59)∗ (−7.17)∗ (−6.58)∗
Lesbian coefficient −1.69 −1.71 −2.04
Lesbian odds ratio .18 −0.17 0.13
(−9.57)∗ (−8.53)∗ (−8.59)∗
Gay× Children 1.00 2.05
Gay× Children odds ratio 2.73 7.77
(1.81) (3.35)∗
Lesbian× Children 0.14 0.51
Lesbian× Children odds ratio 1.23 1.67
(0.05) (0.97)
Children 0.81 0.38 0.66
Children odds ratio 2.24 1.46 1.95
(23.67)∗ (12.40)∗ (24.58)∗
Lesbian × Healthy 0.02 0.01 0.04
odds ratio 1.01 1.01 1.03
(0.07) (0.05) (0.11)
Gay × Healthy −0.31 −0.28 −031
odds ratio 0.73 0.75 0.73
(−1.07) (−0.86) (−0.80)
Heterosexual × Healthy 0.28 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.38
odds ratio 1.32 1.22 1.14 1.04 1.47
(11.30)∗ (6.68)∗ (6.45)∗ (1.80) (14.83)∗
Exogenous Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Weighted observations Yes Yes Yes
Robust Std. Errors Yes Yes Yes
N 146,189 118,600 196,123 144,749 199,891
Log Likelihood −3, 031, 551 −2, 469, 837 −2, 874, 101 −2, 190, 262 −4, 687, 039
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.16
* Significant at the 5% level. t-statistics in parentheses.
Exogenous Controls: Age, Year, White. Other Controls: Smoking, Income, Spouse Income, Urban,
Graduate Work, Obesity.
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